Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence

Keywords

Incentive, Contract theory, Economics, Law and economics, Public economics

References

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• The Role of Termination in Employment Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Film Directors’ CareersKose John, S. Abraham Ravid, Jayanthi Sunder — 2002
• Does Governance Quality Mitigate Horizon Effects? Investment Patterns Surrounding CEO DeparturesAnnita Florou, Martin J. Conyon — 2004
• CEO pay slice and firm value: evidence from UK panel dataValentina Tarkovska — 2017
• Effect of Personal Taxes on Managers' Decision to Sell Unrestricted EquityLi Jin, S.P. Kothari — 2006
• Board Remuneration, Performance and Corporate Governance in Large Spanish CompaniesRafel Crespí‐Cladera, Carles Gispert — 1999
• Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: Evidence from Banking IndustryOzge Uygur — 2014
• A Continuous-Time Model of Career Concerns and Human Capital AccumulationGonzalo Cisternas — 2011
• Accounting conservatism and the structure of CEO compensationYantu Wen — 2008
• The Search for Corporate ControlMarc Martos-Vila — 2010
• Essays on reference-dependent preferencesMacera Parra, Rosario Claudia — 2010
• Le design institutionnel public : analyse économique de la réforme de l'administrationL. Percebois — 2006
• Team Signaling and Collective Reputation with an Application to the Optimal Sharing RuleJinbo Li, Huihua Nie, Ji Shen — 2009
• The relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in large listed companies of New Zealand and SingaporeSalman Afkhami Rad — 2014
• Pay Gap in Top Management Team and Diversification OperationHaifan Lu — 2010
• Rewards and Reputation from the Managerial Labor Market and Strategic Information DistortionQianqian Huang, Feng Jiang, Fei Xie — 2015
• Vergütung von Managern deutscher AktienfondsKerstin Drachter, Alexander Kempf — 2012
• Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936-2003Carola Frydman — 2019
• Essays on Resource Allocation Efficiency and BehaviorJulianna Butler — 2014

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