Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1979-11-01
- Cited by
- 5,713
- References
- 14
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2050904362
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:42331944
Keywords
Rank (graph theory), Incentive, Adverse selection, Order (exchange), Compensation (psychology)
References
- Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement.
- The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
- The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization
- Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
- Choice, Chance, and the Personal Distribution of Income
- Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
- Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
- On the method of paired comparisons.
- THE MOST SUITABLE PROPORTION BETWEEN THE VALUES OF FIRST AND SECOND PRIZES
- Selecting and Ordering Populations: A New Statistical Methodology
- Job Market Signaling
- The Method of Paired Comparisons.
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- EFFORT, RACE GAPS, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
- CEO pay slice and firm value: evidence from UK panel data
- Staffing strategies in SME's: determinants of external recruitment and internal promotion
- Rank-order tournaments as selection mechanisms: Applications in project finance
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- Industrial Relations Research Association Series
- The Organization of Knowledge-Intensive Production: Hierarchies and Specialization in Legal Services
- Anreize zu produktiven und destruktiven Anstrengungen durch relative Entlohnung
- Who Will Survive? A Competing Risks Analysis of Interdependent Top Executive Turnover Events
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