Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts

Keywords

Revelation, Economics, Political science, Law and economics, Philosophy

References

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• On Implicit Contracts and Involuntary UnemploymentJohn Geanakoplos, Takatoshi Ito — 1982
• Theories of Wage RigidityJoseph E. Stiglitz — 1984
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian DynamicsOliver Hart, Jean Tirole — 1988
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency ContractsDrew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole — 1990
• Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase ConjectureFaruk Gül, Hugo Sonnenschein, Robert Wilson — 1986
• Theories of Wage RigidityJoseph E. Stiglitz — 1984
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency ContractsDrew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole — 1988

Cited by

• Early Contract Termination and Specic Investment yBernhard Ganglmair — 2009
• Costs and Benefits from Repricing Employee Stock OptionsBarbara Pirchegger — 2002
• Contractual Flexibility in Transport Infrastructure PPPSérgio Domingues, Dejan Zlatkovic, Athena Roumboutsos — 2014
• Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contractsMohan Bijapur — 2011
• Applying the decision rights to a case of hospital institutional designFlorence Eid — 2001
• Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of “Bao (Contract)” and “Bisai (Contest)” : A Contract Theory AnalysisYutaka Suzuki — 2015
• Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private informationSergiu C. Ungureanu — 2016
• Comportement face au risque et risque de comportement : analyse et implications au NigerAhamadou Maichanou — 2014
• Entrada y negociaciones salariales que abarcan varios períodosJuan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz — 1998
• Designing institutions and incentives in hospitals: an organization economics methodology.Florence Eid — 2003
• Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen InstitutionenökonomikLars Kumkar — 1998
• Breach of Contract and Rejection with Imperfect Expectation Damages ∗Bernhard Ganglmair — 2010
• Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise ? Comprendre la décision de la banqueCatherine Refait-Alexandre — 2005
• Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency FrameworkYutaka Suzuki — 2013
• "Friendships" in Vertical RelationsLeonardo Felli, J. Miguel Villas‐Boas — 1996
• Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information: On the foundations of incomplete contracts.Sönje Reiche — 2001
• Understanding Good Institutional Design in Hospital Corporatization: A Decision Rights ApproachFlorence Eid — 2000
• The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgradesGabriel Buchmann, Marcelo Côrtes Nerí — 2008
• Contract Renegotiation and Organizational DesignMichel Poitevin — 1995
• Modelling performance in a Balanced Scorecard: findings from a case studyJean‐Pierre Ponssard, Olivier Saulpic — 2002

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