Why Do Entrepreneurs Hold Large Ownership Shares? Testing Agency Theory Using Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth

Keywords

Principal–agent problem, Agency cost, Agency (philosophy), Business, Entrepreneurship

References

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Cited by

• Investor type and new-venture governance:cognition vs. interest alignmentChristophe Bonnet, Peter Wirtz — 2010
• Agency costs and R&D: Evidence from Finnish SMEsLotta Väänänen — 2003
• Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against LobbiesNicoletta Berardi, Paul Seabright — 2010
• When Trade Credit Facilitates Access to Bank Finance: Evidence from US Small Business DataÉric Séverin, Pascal Alphonse, Jacqueline Ducret — 2004
• Investor Type, Cognitive Governance and Performance in Young Entrepreneurial Ventures:A Conceptual FrameworkChristophe Bonnet, Peter Wirtz — 2011
• Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous riskMing Guo, Hui Ou‐Yang — 2006
• Decision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance: A Behavioral PerspectiveRassoul Yazdipour — 2009
• IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com BubbleAlexander Ljungqvist, William J. Wilhelm — 2003
• Swimming with Sharks: Technology Ventures, Defense Mechanisms and Corporate RelationshipsRiitta Katila, Jeff D. Rosenberger, Kathleen M. Eisenhardt — 2008
• Advances in Entrepreneurial FinanceRassoul Yazdipour — 2011
• The Dynamics of Financing Constraints and Investor Protection ∗Nisan Langberg — 2003
• Beyond Agency Theory: Value Creation and the Role of Cognition in the Relationship Between Entrepreneurs and Venture CapitalistsPeter Wirtz — 2011
• The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance The Journal of Entrepreneurial FinanceR. Yazdipour
• A Behavioral Finance Approach to Decision Making in Entrepreneurial FinanceR. Yazdipour — 2011
• SWIMMING WITH SHARKS: TECHNOLOGY VENTURES AND CORPORATE RELATIONSHIPSR. Katila — 2008

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