Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy

Keywords

Incentive, Payment, Supervisor, Hierarchy, Actuarial science

References

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• Corporate Control and Business BehaviorCarl Kaysen, Oliver E. Williamson — 1971
• Insurance, Information, and Individual ActionAlan Spence, Richard Zeckhauser — 1971

Cited by

• Triptyque de libéralisation, mondialisation et financiarisation : implications pour la croissance économique, le développement et la stabilité dans les économies en développement et émergentesSaadia Irshad — 2013
• Gains from Contracting: for US Hog GrowersM. Uddin — 2012
• Business Aspects of Web ServicesChristof Weinhardt, Benjamin Blau, Tobias Conte — 2013
• Les déterminants des investissements des salariés dans les fonds communs de placement d'entreprise d'actionnariat salariéNicolas Aubert — 2007
• Other People's Money: The Effects of Ownership on Compensation Strategy and Executive PaySteve Werner, Henry L. Tosi — 1994
• Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement.M Harris, A Raviv — 1978
• Promotions, Elections and Other ContestsSherwin Rosen — 2016
• La señalización y la estructura informativa de los mercadosMichael Spence — 2002
• Agency Theory, Incentives, and Student Loans.Lawrence M. Rudner — 1991
• Incentivos a la dirección y gobierno de empresas: el caso de las stock optionsMónica Melle Hernández — 2001
• INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION : PART I. ALTERNATIVE MODELS WITH A COMMON RISKYasuhiro Sakai — 1990
• Essais d'économie appliquée sur l'intervention d'une tierce partie dans la relation d'agence.Nicolas Jacquemet — 2005
• A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy.Beth J. Asch, John T. Warner — 1994
• La información y el cambio en el paradigma de la ciencia económicaJoseph E. Stiglitz — 2002
• Worker Democracy and Worker ProductivitySarah F. Brosnan — 2006
• The Recognition and Reward of Employee Performance: Implications for Education and Training Policy.John H. Bishop — 1986
• Fair Trade in the Fields of Florida: The Impact of the Penny-Per-Pound on Tomato PickersHyejin Ku — 2014
• Firm-Level Transparency in the Former East Bloc: Empirical Evidence from the Baltic RegionYuan Ding, Ole‐Kristian Hope, Hannu J. Schadewitz — 2009
• Origines et fonctions de la hiérarchie : trente ans de débats, 1968-1998Bruno Tinel — 2000
• Financial determinants of hospital performanceMohammad Naim Chaker — 1995

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• Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor ContractsEdward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen — 1979
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