Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In
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- Type
- report
- Published
- 2004-03-01
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 78
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2120968678
Keywords
Law and economics, Economics
References
- Buyer-Option Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Hold-Up Problem
- Moral Hazard and Observability
- Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
- Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts.
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Com-patibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts
- Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem
- Restricting the Means of Exchange within Organizations
- The Nature of the Firm
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Monopoly and product quality
- A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Cited by
- Kontrakt dłużny w świetle teorii kontraktowej
- Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs
- Incomplete Contracts Modelling
- Foundations of Incomplete Contract Theory: A Survey
- Introducing managerial attention allocation in incentive contracts
- Renegotiation Facilitates Contractual Incompleteness
- The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation
- Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance
- The Interplay of Formal and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Movies
- Optimal limited authority for principal
- Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes
- Looking for a Theory of the Firm: Future Challenges
- Reconciling the Wage Curve and the Phillips Curve
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets
- THE JANUS‐FACED ECONOMY: HONG KONG FIRMS AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN GLOBAL CUSTOMERS AND LOCAL PRODUCERS IN THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
- Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement
- Why Do Team Projects Progress Slowly? A Model Based on Strategic Uncertainty
- Some Notes on Residual Inequality
- Effects of contractual flexibility on conflict and project success in megaprojects
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