Buyer-Option Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Hold-Up Problem

Keywords

Economics, Microeconomics, Business

References

• Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency ProblemsAaron S. Edlin, Benjamin E. Hermalin — 2000
• Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex EnvironmentsEric Rasmusen, Thomas P. Lyon — 2001
• Legal Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory “Contract”Thomas P. Lyon, Haizhou Huang — 2002
• Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and ContractsIan Ayres, Kristin M. Madison — 1999
• Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts.W. Bentley MacLeod, James M. Malcomson — 1993
• The Performance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal MarketsPaul L. Joskow — 1990
• Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart, John Moore — 1998
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin, Jean Tirole — 1999
• Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading CostsEric Rasmusen — 2001
• Incomplete Contracts and RenegotiationOliver Hart, John Moore — 1988
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An IntroductionJohn Sutton — 1986
• Cooperative Investments and the Value of ContractingYeon‐Koo Che, Donald B. Hausch — 1999
• Incomplete Contracts with Cross-InvestmentsSergei Guriev — 2003
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelAriel Rubinstein — 1982
• Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?Jean Tirole — 1999
• Implementation and RenegotiationEric Maskin, John Moore — 1998
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete ContractsIlya Segal — 1999
• Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly RecontractingAlan Schwartz, Joel Watson — 2000
• RENEGOTIATION DESIGN WITH UNVERIFIABLE INFORMATIONPhilippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Rey — 1994
• The Economic Institutions of CapitalismWilliam M. Dugger — 1987

Cited by

• Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative InvestmentsAlexander Stremitzer — 2012
• Breach remedies inducing hybrid investmentsDaniel Göller, Alexander Stremitzer — 2014
• SpeciÞcity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments Forthcoming JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONMatthew Ellman — 2005
• The analysis of BOT strategies based on game theory – case study on Taiwan's high speed railway projectTien-Chien Chen, Yu‐Cheng Lin, Lung-Chuang Wang — 2012
• Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out But Do Not Rule inOliver Hart, John Moore — 2004
• Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule InOliver Hart, John Moore — 2004
• Essays in Law and Economics by Tongyai IyavarakulTongyai Iyavarakul, P. Arcidiacono, Hanming Fang — 2009

Related papers

• Why Use Requirement Contracts? The Tradeoff between Price Premium and BreachEric Rasmusen — 2015
• Analysis on option contracts of investment hold-upHua Wu — 2003
• Renegotiation and Specific PerformanceTracy R. Lewis, Martin Perry, David E. M. Sappington — 1989
• Contracts: Consideration: Effect of Clauses in Real Estate Contracts Conditioning Buyer's PromiseRobert M. Brown — 1959
• Making a market for Miscanthus: can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem?Steven Y. Wu, Stephanie Rosch, Corinne E. Alexander — 2010
• Modeling breach of contract risk through bundled optionsÇagrõ Haksöz, Koray D. Simsek — 2010
• Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement ContractsSteven Tadelis, Patrick Bajari — 2001