Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1999-01-01
- Cited by
- 734
- References
- 32
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W1974058864
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:4889784
Keywords
Economics, Positive economics, Law and economics
References
- Implementation in Environments with Complete Information (Now published as 'Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information' in J-J Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Invited Papers to the World Congress of the Econometric Society, vol.I (1992), pp.182-
- A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson
- Firms, contracts, and financial structure
- A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence
- The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
- Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Sequential investments and options to own
- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
- Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
- Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Complexity, Contract and the Employment Relationship
- Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
- Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?
- Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form
- Implementation and Renegotiation
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- Essays on Strategic Information Transmission
- Optimal Global Value of Information Trials: Better Aligning Manufacturer and Decision Maker Interests and Enabling Feasible Risk Sharing
- Performance and completeness in repeated inter-firm relationships: the case of franchising
- Is Grameen Lending Efficient
- A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében [The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts]
- Essays on contract theory
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations
- Discretion in Agency Contracts
- Buyer-Option Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Hold-Up Problem
- Entrepreneurs with Ties
- Reputation and Pay Structure in Dynamic Contracts
- Value-adding partnerships in proprietary value-enhanced specialty grain: A case study of High Oil Corn
- Community and Autonomy: Institutions, Policies and Legitimacy in Multilevel Europe
- Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Insights from Jean-Jacques Laffont’s last book
- Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages Be Sent?
- Origines et fonctions de la hiérarchie : trente ans de débats, 1968-1998
- Optimal contracting and vertical coordination in the beef industry: An assessment of value-based pricing
- Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem
- Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and the Incomplete Contracting Theory
- Sequential costly state verifications under two-state Markov chain shocks
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