Legal Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory “Contract”

Keywords

Damages, Sunk costs, Investment (military), Public finance, Microeconomics

References

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• Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up ProblemThomas P. Lyon — 2004

Cited by

• Buyer-Option Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Hold-Up ProblemEric Rasmusen, Thomas P. Lyon — 2004
• Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex EnvironmentsEric Rasmusen, Thomas P. Lyon — 2001
• DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUFrancisca Bremberger, Carlo Cambini, Klaus Gugler — 2016
• Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilitiesCarlo Cambini, Laura Rondi — 2010
• Regulation, competition, and the optimal recovery of stranded costsT. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman, John W. Mayo — 2003
• Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up ProblemThomas P. Lyon — 2004
• Allocating Law-Making Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government RegulationPeter Grajzl, Peter Murrell — 2005
• THE FIFTY MOST IMPORTANT PAPERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATIONDarryl R. Biggar — 2011
• Anreizregulierung bei Stromverteilnetzen: Effizienz versus InvestitionenGert Brunekreeft, Roland Meyer — 2016
• The Impact of Regulation on Utilities’ Investments: A Survey and New Evidence from the Energy IndustryLaura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi — 2018
• Seven outstanding issues in energy network regulationDarryl R. Biggar — 2022
• Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government regulationPeter Grajzl, Peter Murrell — 2007
• The Strategic Role of Managerial Incentives on Supplier Capacity InvestmentS. Gilbert, Xiaohui Xu — 2006
• Managing Vertical and Horizontal Supply Chain Relationships in the Absence of Formal ContractsXiaohui Xu — 2005

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