Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

Keywords

Punishment (psychology), Free rider problem, Order (exchange), Set (abstract data type), Social dilemma

References

• Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruismErnst Fehr, Bettina Rockenbach — 2003
• Games, groups, and the global goodSimon A Levin — 2009
• The Major Transitions in EvolutionJohn Maynard Smith, Eörs Szathmáry — 1997
• The Drama of the CommonsNational Research Council — 2002
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• The Long-Run Benefits of PunishmentSimon Gächter, Elke Renner, Martín Sefton — 2008
• Cooperation and Punishment, Especially in HumansAndy Gardner, Stuart A. West — 2004
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When RareRobert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles — 2010
• Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problemArhan S. Ertan, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman — 2009
• Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods gameDirk Semmann, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, Manfred Milinski — 2003
• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square latticeGyörgy Szabó, Csaba Tőke — 1997
• The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishmentBettina Rockenbach, Manfred Milinski — 2006
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• Strong Reciprocity or Strong Ferocity? A Population Genetic View of the Evolution of Altruistic PunishmentLaurent Lehmann, François Rousset, Denis Roze — 2007
• The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning InstitutionsÖzgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bettina Rockenbach — 2006
• The provision of a sanctioning system as a public goodToshio Yamagishi — 1986
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher.Mayuko Nakamaru, Yoh Iwasa — 2006
• Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods ExperimentsErnst Fehr, Simon Gächter — 2000
• When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation?Sarah Mathew, Robert Boyd — 2009
• Mutual policing and repression of competition in the evolution of cooperative groupsSteven A. Frank — 1995

Cited by

• Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishmentPedro del Olmo García — 2013
• Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibilityRafael Bielsa, Carlos García Blaya — 2014
• EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETIC MODELING OF DECISION MAKING AND CULTUREP. Roos — 2012
• A Threshold Hypothesis of Institutional Change: Collective Action in the Italian Alps during the 13th-19th CenturiesClaudio Tagliapietra — 2017
• The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of CooperationIsamu Okada, H. Yamamoto, Fujio Toriumi — 2015
• The Evolutionary Interpretation of Man: The Matryoshka ModelGyörgy Marosán — 2011
• Evolutionary games and equilibrium selectionBoyu Zhang — 2012
• Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basisPatrick Roos, Michele J. Gelfand, Dana Nau — 2015
• Coevolution between strategy and social networks structure promotes cooperationJiaqi Li, Chunyan Zhang, Qinglin Sun — 2015
• Experimental and theoretical investigations of the emergence and sustenance of prosocial behavior in groupsKatrin Fehl — 2011
• Sanctioning by Institution, Skepticism of Punisher and the Evolution of CooperationJun-Sok Huhh — 2011
• The evolution of fairness preferences, altruistic punishment, and cooperationPhilipp Moritz Hetzer — 2011
• The Hired Gun MechanismJames Andreoni, Laura Gee — 2011
• Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental InvestigationEric S. Dickson, Sanford C. Gordon, Gregory A. Huber — 2015
• Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action ProblemsPeter J. Richerson, Joe Henrich — 2012
• Context-dependent incremental decision making scrutinizing the intentions of others via Bayesian network model constructionThe Anh Han, Luı́s Moniz Pereira — 2013
• Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation BoardsRocío Botta, Gerardo Blanco, Christian E. Schaerer — 2014
• A Theory of Evolution, Fairness, and Altruistic PunishmentMoritz Hetzer, Didier Sornette — 2011
• A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection gamesMatjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki — 2015
• The Social Maintenance of Cooperation through HypocrisyTodd Bodnar, Marcel Salathé — 2013

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