EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETIC MODELING OF DECISION MAKING AND CULTURE
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Summary
This work advances the state of the art of EGT and its applications to the social sciences by creating novel EGT models to study different phenomena of interest in human decision-making and culture and using these models to provide insights about the relationships between variables in these models and their impact on evolutionary outcomes.
- Published
- 2012-01-01
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 117
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:140797887
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