Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment
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Summary
A mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways are provided, uncovering the existence of a democracy premium.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2013-12-23
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 54
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W24367116
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:3235733
Keywords
Geography
References
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Cited by
- The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation
- Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation.
- A fine rule from a brutish world? An experiment on endogenous punishment institution and trust
- How to keep punishment to maintain cooperation: Introducing social vaccine
- Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution
- Evolution of sanctioning systems and opting out of games of life
- A comparison of biological and cultural evolution
- Does punishment in secure residential youth care work? An overview of the evidence
- First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation
- Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans
- Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations
- Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas
- Physics for better human societies: reply to comments on "Statistical physics of crime: a review".
- Conditional dissociation as a punishment mechanism in the evolution of cooperation
- Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma
- Building the Leviathan – Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans
- Which risk scenarios can drive the emergence of costly cooperation?
- Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm
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