Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous.

Keywords

Punishment (psychology), Tragedy of the commons, Harm, Stochastic game, Social dilemma

References

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• Making the most of mathematical models for effective environmental managementHiroyuki Yokomizo, Gaku Takimoto — 2013
• Coupled social and ecological dynamics of herders in Mongolian rangelandsJoung Hun Lee, Kaoru Kakinuma, Toshiya Okuro — 2015
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging.Joung-Hun Lee, Karl Sigmund, Ulf Dieckmann — 2015
• Impact of Preference and Equivocators on Opinion Dynamics with Evolutionary Game FrameworkDeng, Xinyang, Zhen Wang, Qi Liu — 2015
• Modeling socio-economic aspects of ecosystem management and biodiversity conservationJoung Hun Lee, Yoh Iwasa — 2013
• Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons to environmental variabilityMaja Schl�ter, Alessandro Tavoni, Simon A. Levin — 2014
• Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public GoodsDaria Roithmayr, Alexander Isakov, David G. Rand — 2015
• Evolution of cooperation by the introduction of the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoffTetsushi Ohdaira — 2016
• Study of the Evolution of Cooperation Based on an Alternative Notion of Punishment "Sanction with Jealousy"Tetsushi Ohdaira — 2016
• Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoffTetsushi Ohdaira — 2017
• Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources.Joung-Hun Lee, Marko Jusup, Yoh Iwasa — 2017
• Effect of marine reserve establishment on non-cooperative fisheries managementNao Takashina, Joung-Hun Lee, Hugh P. Possingham — 2017
• Collective Action Problem in Heterogeneous Groups with Punishment and ForesightLogan Perry, Mahendra Duwal Shrestha, Michael D. Vose — 2018
• Profit Sharing as a Management Strategy for a State-owned Teak Plantation at High Risk for Illegal LoggingJoung Hun Lee, Yuki Kubo, Takahiro Fujiwara — 2018
• Interpreting the iterated dilemma games using the presentation like “cellular automatons”Yuji Aruka — 2018
• Regime shifts in ecological and socio-ecological systemsRam Sigdel — 2019
• Convergence of socio-ecological dynamics in disparate ecological systems under strong coupling to human social systemsRam Sigdel, Madhur Anand, Chris T. Bauch — 2018
• Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods gamesYan Li, Xinsheng Liu, Jens Christian Claussen — 2019
• Governance of Risky Public Goods under Graduated Punishment.Marta C. Couto, Jorge M. Pacheco, Francisco C. Santos — 2020

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