Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging.
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Summary
An evolutionary game model is studied to analyze the illegal harvesting of forest trees, coupled with the corruption of rule enforcers, suggesting that the education of en forcers, causing their more frequent trialing of honest conduct, can be a potent means of curbing corruption.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2015-02-21
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 62
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2012461619
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:4967273
Keywords
Language change, Business, Illegal logging, Enforcement, Logging
References
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- Understanding Institutional Diversity
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- The economics of nonformal education
- Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives
- In medio stat virtus: Theoretical and methodological extremes regarding reciprocity will not explain complex social behaviors
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- Collective restraint in social dilemmas: Procedural justice and social identification effects on support for authorities.
- Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous.
Cited by
- Detecting and understanding non-compliance with conservation rules
- Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery
- Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption
- Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
- UNDERSTANDING ILLEGALITY AND CORRUPTION IN FOREST MAN- AGEMENT: A LITERATURE REVIEW
- Emergence of cooperation as a restult of mutation and inheritance in PD/PG-like game
- DAMPAK PEMBERANTASAN KORUPSI TERHADAP PEREKONOMIAN, EMISI KARBON DAN SEKTOR KEHUTANAN INDONESIA (Corruption Eradication Impacts on The Economy, Carbon Emissions and Forestry Sector in Indonesia)
- Understanding illegality and corruption in forest governance.
- Eliminating Illegal Timber Consumption or Production: Which Is the More Economical Means to Reduce Illegal Logging?
- Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games
- Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources.
- Effect of marine reserve establishment on non-cooperative fisheries management
- Ecological Integrative Systems in Linking Sciences and Societies --Social Consilience Based on Information Provision and Ecological Efficiency Appreciation
- The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor.
- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control.
- Bribery Games on Interdependent Complex Networks
- The policy analysis of governing illegal logging: A game theory approach
- Illegal Harvesting of Locally Endangered Olea europaea Subsp. cuspidata (Wall. ex G. Don) Cif. and Its Causes in Hugumburda Forest, Northern Ethiopia
- Zero-sum polymatrix games with link uncertainty: A Dempster-Shafer theory solution
- Guiding self-organized pattern formation in cell polarity establishment
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