Myopic Agency and Bonus Bank Contracts
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- Published
- 2013-01-01
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- 22
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:221082773
References
- Contracting Timely Delivery with Hard to Verify Quality
- Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective
- Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
- A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence
- Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
- AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES
- Dynamic CEO Compensation
- Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
- Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- Motivating Innovation
- The Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Oil Futures in a Production Economy with Investment Constraints
- Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives
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