Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Keywords

Executive compensation, Executive order, Agency (philosophy), Compensation (psychology), Executive branch

References

• Executive Compensation Incentives in a Volatile MarketMiles Cahill, Alaina C. George — 2005
• Voting Power, Control Rents and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Analysis of Owner Control and Corporate GovernanceYinghong Chen — 2004
• Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock OptionsKevin J. Murphy — 2002
• A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy ContestsLucian A. Bebchuk, Marcel Kahan — 1990
• New thinking on how to link executive pay with performance.Alfred Rappaport — 1999
• Executive Compensation and Corporate FraudShane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Yisong S. Tian — 2003
• Investment Intelligence from Insider TradingEdward M. Miller — 1999
• Firm Value and Managerial IncentivesAlexander Ljungqvist, Michel A. Habib — 2000
• Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix ThemMichael C. Jensen, K. J. Murphy, Eric G. Wruck — 2004
• The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and PolicyLucian A. Bebchuk, John Coates, Guhan Subramanian — 2002
• Enhancing Corporate Governance with One- and Two-Tiered Convertible Preferred StockRodolfo Apreda — 2004
• Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive CompensationMarilyn F. Johnson, Susan L. Porter, Margaret B. Shackell — 1997
• Executive Pay, Free Float, and Firm Performance: Evidence from GermanyChristoph Kaserer, Niklas Wagner — 2004
• CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonusesYaniv Grinstein, Paul Hribar — 2004
• The Impact of Personal Income Taxation on Executive CompensationPeter Katuščák — 2004
• Tunnel-proofing the Executive Suite: Overvaluation, Opacity, Temptation,and Executive CompensationThomas H. Noe — 2004
• Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation: Executives are Paid for (Good) Luck But Not Punished for BadG. T. Garvey, Todd T. Milbourn — 2003
• Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading DisclosureJesse M. Fried — 1998
• Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive CompensationBebchuk, Lucian Arye, Fried, Jesse M. — 2004
• The Composition of Institutional Ownership and the Structure of CEO CompensationJae Yong Shin — 2005

Cited by

• Shareholder Democracy and its Discontents: Outrage, Captured Boards, and the Veil of IgnoranceSudipto Dasgupta, Thomas H. Noe — 2011
• CEO Pay and Appointments: Putting Integrity Back into Hiring DecisionsKatja Rost — 2007
• CEO Deal-Making Activity, CEO Compensation and Firm ValueEliezer M. Fich, Laura T. Starks, Adam S. Yore — 2008
• Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-PowerVs. Optimal Contracting DebateG. Bianchi — 2013
• The Design and Success of Stock Options Plans for New Economy Firms in GermanyWolfgang Bessler, Christoph Becker, Daniil Wagner — 2009
• Executive Compensation Incentives in a Volatile MarketMiles Cahill, Alaina C. George — 2005
• CEO pay slice and firm value: evidence from UK panel dataValentina Tarkovska — 2017
• Gender Diversity on Boards of Directors and Remuneration Committees: The Influence on Listed Companies in SpainR. A. Silow — 2018
• Equity-Based Incentives: Wealth Transfers, Disruption Costs and New ModelsMichael C. I. Nwogugu — 2007
• Two Papers on "How Perceptions of Fairness and Influences of Social Capital and Source Credibility Matter to Compensation Committees And Investors"Anne M. Wilkins — 2012
• Incentive Effects of Extreme CEO Pay CutsHuasheng Gao, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li — 2009
• Experimental Studies on Moral Values in Finance : Windfall Gains, Socially Responsible Investment, and Compensation PlansMarco Heimann — 2013
• Essays in Banking and Corporate Finance.Jason D. Kotter — 2014
• The Struggle for Power and Pay: Implications of Board of Directors' Power on Monitoring Effectiveness and Pay for Performance SensitivityMariana J. Lebrón — 2013
• Option pricing and corporate report disclosures: managerial incentives to undervalueElisha J. Kelly, Nicholas A. Mroczkowski, Christine Jubb — 2006
• ORGANIZATION ATTRACTIVENESS AND EMPLOYEES' COMMITMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON MALAYSIAN BANKSJia Yi Lim, Pei Shan Lim, Yi Xun Lim — 2013
• CEO remuneration: Australian evidence of the influence of reputation, performance and governanceDamian Tien Foo Niap — 2013
• Combining Financial and Organizational Incentives to Better Align Individual Behaviour with Organizational GoalsPhilipp Meyer‐Doyle, Marshall W. Meyer — 2010
• En utvärdering av SEB:s incitamentsprogram för ledande befattningshavareHenrik Hansson — 2011
• A Study of Board Remuneration Committees : Structure and EffectivenessKim Kercher — 2013

Related papers

• Advertising Agency Compensation: An Agency Theory ExplanationDeborah F. Spake, Giles D’Souza, Tammy Neal Crutchfield — 1999
• Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between April 26 and May 31, 1939L. F. Schmeckebier — 1939
• Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between July 16,1938, and April 25, 1939Laurence Frederick Schmeckebier — 1939
• Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States. Changes between November 1,1933, and March 15, 1934Laurence Frederick Schmeckebier — 1934
• Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between April 12 and July 15, 1940Laurence Frederick Schmeckebier — 1936