Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1983-04-01
- Cited by
- 2,760
- References
- 7
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2087530244
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:13889991
Keywords
Impossibility, Valuation (finance), Microeconomics, Incentive compatibility, Subsidy
References
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- Cadangan Model Teoritikal bagi Menilai Kecekapan Pelaburan dalam Pembangunan Tanah Rizab Melayu
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- The optimality of being efficient: designing auctions
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