Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players

Pathikrit Basu · Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design · 2023

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Type: article
Published: 2023-12-21
Cited by: 0
References: 0
Access: Open access
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004
OpenAlex: https://openalex.org/W4390048635
Semantic Scholar: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:266479433

Keywords

Incentive compatibility, Mechanism design, Mechanism (biology), Incentive, Payment

References

A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational CascadesSushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch — 1992
Mathematical Statistics A Decision Theoretic ApproachGerald S. Rogers, Thomas S. Ferguson — 1968
Strategy-proofness in the LargeEduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish — 2018
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades.Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch
Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions.I. J. Good, D. Blackwell, M. A. Girschick — 1956

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