Credible coalitions and the core
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1989-09-01
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 5
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2045815042
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:122176821
Keywords
Core (optical fiber), Credibility, Blocking (statistics), Mathematical economics, Computer science
References
Cited by
- A Neumann-féle játékelmélet
- Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets
- Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
- Stochastic bankruptcy games
- Coalition Formation in Political Games
- Note On the core of a collection of coalitions
- The Farsighted Stable Set
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
- The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies
- Insurance monopoly and renegotiation
- The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set
- A consistent bargaining set
- Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
- Deviations, uncertainty and the core
- Stability of the Core in a Class of NTU Games: a Characterization
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets
- An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
- A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints
- Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox
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