The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1995-10-01
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 8
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W1972937949
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:153547089
Keywords
Core (optical fiber), Public finance, Production (economics), Public good, Economics
References
- The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach
- Credible coalitions and the core
- The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets
- The Theory Of General Economic Equilibrium
- The core and the Lindahl equilibrium of an economy with a public good: an example
- Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy.
- Markets with a continuum of traders
- A LIMIT THEOREM ON THE CORE OF AN ECONOMY
Cited by
- Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches
- Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
- The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set
- Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
- von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies
- Stable Sets of a Strategic Public Good Provision Game
- Situation Approach to Cooperation
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- Are public goods public goods?
- The group incentive properties of mechanisms for the provision of public goods
- Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect
- Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect
- Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy