CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation

Keywords

Incentive, Principal–agent problem, Accounting, Business, Product (mathematics)

References

• Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysisWilbur G. Lewellen, Claudio Loderer, Kenneth J. Martin — 1987
• Moral Hazard and ObservabilityBengt Holmström — 1979
• Economics, Organization and ManagementSudipto Bhattacharya, Paul Milgrom, John W. Roberts — 1992
• Corporate Control and Managerial Misrepresentation of Firm PerformanceGerald L. Salamon, E. Dan Smith — 1979
• An Investigation of the Bundling of Compensation PlansStacey R. Kole — 1991
• Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporateJennifer J. Gaver, Kenneth M. Gaver — 1993
• Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensationRobert M. Bushman, Raffi Indjejikian — 1993
• Organizational Differences in Managerial Compensation and Financial PerformanceBarry Gerhart, G. T. Milkovich — 1990
• Determinants of corporate borrowingStewart C. Myers — 1977
• The Structure of Organizational IncentivesRichard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, Keith Weigelt — 1993
• An Empirical-Investigation Of The Relative Performance Evaluation Of Corporate-ExecutivesRick Antle, Abbie J. Smith — 1986
• The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation PoliciesClifford W. Smith, Ross L. Watts — 1992
• Market Liquidity and Performance MonitoringBengt Holmström, Jean Tirole — 1993
• On the Efficiency of Stock-Based CompensationJonathan M. Paul — 1992
• Private benefits from block ownership and discounts on closed-end fundsMichael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness, Jeffrey Pontiff — 1993
• Accounting earnings and top executive compensationRichard G. Sloan — 1993
• Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorJeremy C. Stein — 1989
• Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behaviorJohn M. Bizjak, James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles — 1993
• AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTSRichard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker — 1987
• Investment Options, Assets in Place, and the Risk of StocksKee H. Chung, Charlie Charoenwong — 1991

Cited by

• Subjectivity in Incentive PayTahir M. Nisar — 2006
• El diseño de la retribución de los directivos y su efecto sobre los resultados empresarialesEva María Aguilar Pastor — 2000
• Do Motivation and Equity Ownership Matter in Board of Directors' Evaluation of CEO PerformancePaula Alexandra Silva — 2005
• Trends in Dutch Executive CompensationD.M. Swagerman, Erik Terpstra — 2009
• Bonus Contracts, Private Information and CEO TurnoverFelix Hoppe, Frank Moers — 2008
• Relationship of Planning and Control Systems with Strategic Choices: A Closer LookMichael S. H. Shih, Lee-Chien Yong — 2001
• CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic DeterminantsStephen Bryan, Lee‐Seok Hwang, Steven B. Lilien — 2000
• Determinants of the Importance of Signals on Ability in the Presence of Adverse SelectionRajiv D. Banker, Shaopeng Li, Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich — 2009
• Les déterminants de la rémunération des plus hauts dirigeants exécutifs des entreprises françaises cotées au SBF120Anne Amar-Sabbah — 2012
• Determinants of the Anonymity of the CEO Evaluation ProcessPaula Alexandra Silva, Henry L. Tosi — 2004
• Relative Performance Evaluation and the Use of Discretionary Bonuses in Executive CompensationStephanie Tsui — 2014
• Is Executive Compensation Different Across S&P Listed Firms?João Paulo Vieito, Walayet A. Khan, António Cerqueira — 2008
• Executive Compensation Schemes in the Banking Industry: A Comparative Study between a Developed Country and an Emerging EconomyNelson Waweru, Patrice Gélinas, Enrico Uliana — 2009
• Explaining Executive Pay: The Roles of Managerial Power and ComplexityLukas Hengartner — 2006
• Do executives get more pay prior to deteriorations of firm performanceYu-Ching Wu — 2012
• THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCEEduardo Schiehll — 2001
• CEO Characteristics and the Choice of Using Non-Financial Performance Measures in Compensation ContractsMelloney Simerly — 2015
• The performance impact of using measurement diversity in executives’ annual incentive systemsMonica Franco‐Santos — 2007
• Implicit Incentives for Human Capital AcquisitionIsabella Grabner, Frank Moers — 2015
• Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency settingQintao Fan, Wei Li — 2018

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