Compensation and Incentives in German Corporations
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- Type
- preprint
- Published
- 2011-05-31
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 22
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W1514717234
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:5837682
Keywords
Executive compensation, Incentive, Shareholder, Principal–agent problem, Accounting
References
- Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking?
- Executive Compensation and Managerial Risk-Taking
- The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels
- Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking
- Wealth and Executive Compensation
- CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking
- Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States
- The impact of firm size on pay-performance sensitivities
- The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
- AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
- Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy
- AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES
- Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
- Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies? (Part 2: The Governance of Banks)
- Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness
- The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation: A Revised Comment
- Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
- Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
- Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy
- The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Cited by
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