The Effect of Communication Channels on Lying
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- Type
- preprint
- Published
- 2014-01-06
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 40
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W308676597
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:107320755
Keywords
Lying, Private information retrieval, Channel (broadcasting), Incentive, Phone
References
- Self-Signaling versus Social-Signaling in Giving
- Luck or cheating? A field experiment on honesty with children
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- The grammar of society: the nature and dynamics of social norms
- Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities
- Do the right thing: But only if others do so
- Collective action as a social exchange
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
- Face-to-Face Versus Computer-Mediated Communication: A Synthesis of the Experimental Literature
- Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment
- Machiavellianism and Deception
- Representative evidence on lying costs
- Preferences for Truthfulness: Heterogeneity Among and Within Individuals
- Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions.
- The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
- Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications
- Activation of social norms in social dilemmas: A review of the evidence and reflections on the implications for environmental behaviour
- Social and Moral Norms in the Laboratory
- Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design
- Computer-mediated communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: an experimental analysis
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