A Note on a Comparison of Simultaneous and Sequential Colonel Blotto Games

Yumiko Baba · Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy · 2012

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Type: article
Published: 2012-12-13
Cited by: 0
References: 10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2012-0007
OpenAlex: https://openalex.org/W289151131
Semantic Scholar: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:142132628

Keywords

Mathematical economics, Irrational number, Nash equilibrium, Surrender, Computer science

References

Resource Distribution in Multiple Attacks Against a Single TargetGregory Levitin, Kjell Hausken — 2010
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto gamesSergiu Hart — 2008
Asymmetric ConflictDerek J. Clark, Kai A. Konrad — 2007
Experimental investigationC. Bram, Cadsby Fei Song, Francis Tapon — 2013
Sequential ContestsJohn Morgan — 2003
Efficient Rent SeekingGordon Tullock, Alan A. Lockard — 2001
Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege of SiegeCary Deck, R. Sheremeta, Subhasish M. Chowdhury

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