Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
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Summary
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring and introduces a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2017-11-01
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 42
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2766452142
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:8162149
Keywords
Subgame perfect equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Simple (philosophy), Subgame, Extensive-form game
References
- Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games
- The topology of the 2x2 games : a new periodic table
- An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information
- Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
- Algorithms for Finding Repeated Game Equilibria
- Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
- The Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- Computing Equilibria in Discounted 2 × 2 Supergames
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
- The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
- A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma
- Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting
- A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
Cited by
- Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games
- Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
- Extremal Pure Strategies and Monotonicity in Repeated Games
- Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames
- Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
- Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games