Academia or the private sector? Sorting of agents into output-maximizing institutions

Marie‐Louise Vierø · Econstor (Econstor) · 2009

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Type: article
Published: 2009-01-01
Cited by: 0
References: 10
Access: Open access
OpenAlex: https://openalex.org/W39365691
Semantic Scholar: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:167115846

Keywords

Sorting, Private sector, Business, Economics, Public economics

References

FIRST IN VILLAGE OR SECOND IN ROMEEttore Damiano, Hao Li, Wing Suen — 2010
Incentives in Basic ResearchEdward P. Lazear — 1997
Recursive methods in economic dynamicsNancy L. Stokey, Robert E. Lucas, Edward C. Prescott — 1989
Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure?Heather Carmichael — 1988
An economic theory of academic competition: dynamic incentives and endogenous cumulative advantagesNicolas Carayol — 2008
A game-theoretic explanation of the administrative lattice in institutions of higher learningAndreas Ortmann, Richard Squire — 2000
Competition and Incentives with Motivated AgentsTimothy Besley, Maitreesh Ghatak — 2005
Teaching versus research: a model of state university competitionElena del Rey Canteli — 2000
Specialization in Higher Education ∗Sinan Sarpça — 2007

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