On the misperception of variability.
Explore this paper's citation graph
Summary
Results of 5 experiments show that people use sample variability, uncorrected for sample size, in tasks in which a correction is normatively called for, and indeed perceive variability as smaller than it is.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2002-06-01
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 26
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W12049245
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:6012585
Keywords
Geography
References
- Journal of behavioral decision making: "The need for contextual and technical knowledge in judgmental forecasting", 5 (1992) 39-52
- On the Accentuation of Contingencies: The Sensitive Research Designer versus the Intuitive Statistician
- Cognitive Overload and the Evaluation of Risky Alternatives: The Effects of Sample Size, Information Format and Attitude To Risk
- The illusion of control.
- Cognitive Social Approach to Dispositional Inferences: What if the Perceiver is a Cognitive Social Theorist?
- BELIEF IN THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS
- Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model
- The magical number seven plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information.
- The correspondence bias.
- Personality and Assessment
- Combining graded categories: membership and typicality.
- Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
- Through a narrow window: Sample size and the perception of correlation
- Intuitive judgments of proportions, means, and variances: A review
- Why do categories affect stimulus judgment?
- Through a narrow window: working memory capacity and the detection of covariation.
- Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.
- Statistics for psychologists
- Positive bias in the perception of covariation.
- Seven (indeed, plus or minus two) and the detection of correlations.
Cited by
- Subjective Probability Interval Estimates: A Simple and Effective Way to Reduce Overprecision in Judgment
- Persistence of Naïve Statistical Reasoning Concerning Analysis of Variance
- Un análisis experimental sobre la elección del medio de transporte
- Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice
- The coexistence of overestimation and underweighting of rare events and the contingent recency effect
- The ultimate sampling dilemma in experience-based decision making.
- On the Accentuation of Contingencies: The Sensitive Research Designer versus the Intuitive Statistician
- Naïve Sampling and Format Dependence in Subjective Probability Calibration
- Cognitive Overload and the Evaluation of Risky Alternatives: The Effects of Sample Size, Information Format and Attitude To Risk
- Understanding the phonetics of neutralisation: a variability-field account of vowel/zero alternationsin a Hijazi dialect of Arabic
- Advice from Experience: Communicating Incomplete Information Incompletely
- Is the Intuitive Statistician Eager or Lazy? : Exploring the Cognitive Processes of Intuitive Statistical Judgments
- Unstable mean context causes sensitivity loss and biased estimation of variability.
- Neuronal Distortions of Reward Probability without Choice
- Great oaks from giant acorns grow: How causal‐impact judgments depend on the strength of a cause
- The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty.
- The Impact of Travel Time Information on Travelers’ Learning under Uncertainty
- Are All Data Created Equal? - Exploring Some Boundary Conditions for a Lazy Intuitive Statistician
- Car stickiness: Heuristics and biases in travel choice
- Where did that come from?—Identifying the source of a sample
Related papers
No related papers recorded.