Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets : An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information

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• Intertemporal Risk Management in AgricultureJesse Tack, Rulon D. Pope, Jeffrey T. LaFrance — 2012
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• Structural Duration AnalysisJaap H. Abbring — 2009
• Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part DP. Nowrojee — 2018
• The Securitization of Surplus Notes By Property and Casualty Insurers: Empirical EvidenceTao Zhang — 2007
• Une analyse économique et expérimentale de la fraude à l'assurance et de l'auditSameh Borgi — 2006
• Bouclier sanitaire: choisir entre égalité et équité ? Une analyse à partir du modèle ARAMMISThierry Debrand, Christine Sorasith — 2010
• The Dynamics of Agricultural Insurance and Consumption SmoothingGerald G. Nyambane — 2013
• Workers’ Effort: A Comparison between Capitalist and Cooperative FirmsMichele Alessandrini, Marcello Messori — 2016
• Insurance as a Giffen Good under a Bonus-Malus System and its Effect on Adverse SelectionShinichi Kamiya — 2006
• Hidden Regret and Advantageous Selection in Insurance MarketsRachel J. Huang, Alexander Muermann, Larry Y. Tzeng — 2007
• A Note on Uniqueness in Game-Theoretic Foundations of the Reactive EquilibriumWanda Mimra, Achim Wambach — 2016
• Data Analysis, Machine Learning, and ApplicationsChristine Preisach, Burkhardt, Hans, Schmidt-Thieme, Lars — 2008
• Economics of Information: Incentives and contractsDavid Pérez‐Castrillo — 2008
• The Effects Of Recommendation Conflict On User'S Adoption Intention Toward Virtual Salespersons: A Principal-Agent PerspectiveYongjie Chen, Her‐Sen Doong, Huichich Wang — 2011
• CONSUMER BIASES AND FIRM OWNERSHIPRyan Bubb, Alex Kaufman — 2008
• Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background riskDavid Alary, Franck Bien — 2008

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