Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Cited by
- 2,402
- References
- 36
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W3121440286
Keywords
Economic rent, Politics, Economics, Government (linguistics), Language change
References
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- Corruption: A study in political economy
- Rents, Competition, and Corruption
- Estimating the Value of Political Connections
- INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
- Politicians and Firms
- Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda
- A Theory of Misgovernance
- Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems
- The choice between market failures and corruption
- Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in Emerging Markets
- The quality of government
- HOW BIG SHOULD GOVERNMENT BE?
- Does Competition Kill Corruption?
- A General Equilibrium Model for Tax Policy Evaluation
- The effects of government ownership on bank lending
- Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending In Poor Economies
- Regression with a binary independent variable subject to errors of observation
- Politically Connected Firms
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- The value of political connections : evidence from Korean chaebols
- Ownership structure, corporate governance, and collateral requirements: evidence from China's listed firms
- ESSAYS ON BUSINESS GROUPS AND THE JUDICIARY IN SOUTH KOREA
- The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan
- Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism
- Do Political Blogs Matter? Corruption in State-Controlled Companies, Blog Postings, and DDoS Attacks
- Political Capital, Political Environment and Bank Lending: An Investigation of Chinese Private Entrepreneurial Firms
- Family firms, board structure, political connections and performance: evidence from Bangladesh
- The Political Origin of Home Bias: The Case of Europe
- Political Connections and Firm Performance: The Case of Hong Kong
- Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks
- Achieving superiority in product and customer performance through marketing and innovation resource-capability combinations
- Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Case of Chinese Banking Sector
- The implications of disproportionate ownership in emerging markets: evidence from Chinese listed firms
- Property rights protection and firm diversification: evidence from China
- Property Rights Protection Through Litigations: Ownership Bias and the Role of Political Connections
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