Blameworthiness in Games with Imperfect Information

Keywords

Imperfect, Perfect information, Outcome (game theory), Computer science, Strategic dominance

References

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Cited by

• Predicting responsibility judgments from dispositional inferences and causal attributions.Antonia Frederike Langenhoff, Alex Wiegmann, Joseph Y. Halpern — 2019
• Inference from social evaluation.Zachary Davis, Kelsey R. Allen, Max Kleiman‐Weiner — 2025

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• K-ImplementationDov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz — 2004
• Strategic Information RevelationMasahiro Okuno‐Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite, Kotaro Suzumura — 1990
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model Applied to the Lemonade GameMichael B. Wunder, Michael Kaisers, Michael L. Littman — 2010