Agency costs and moral hazard under the new banks' capital regulation : diagnosis, modelling and solutions
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- Type
- dissertation
- Published
- 2017-05-31
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 99
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2750084912
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:169000210
Keywords
Moral hazard, Agency cost, Shareholder, Incentive, Business
References
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- A test of the free cash flow and debt monitoring hypotheses:: Evidence from audit pricing
- How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting
- How Effectively Can Debt Covenants Reduce Financial Agency Costs?
- Contingent Capital, Real Options and Agency Costs
- Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert
- Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates
- Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis
- Capital and Ownership Structure: A Comparison of United States and Japanese Manufacturing Corporations
- Incentives, Downsizing, and Value Creation at General Dynamics
- Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
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