Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents
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Summary
Considering economic Agents in competition with relative performance concerns, this model derives the optimal contracts in both first best and moral hazard settings and relies heavily on the connection between Nash equilibria and multidimensional quadratic BSDEs.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2016-05-25
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 90
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2402179957
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:156145878
Keywords
Moral hazard, Reservation, Competition (biology), Principal (computer security), Mathematical economics
References
- The Principal-Agent Problem; A Stochastic Maximum Principle Approach
- Continuous Exponential Martingales and Bmo
- On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time
- Applications Of Orlicz Spaces
- Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models
- Moral Hazard and Observability
- The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility
- OPTIMAL INVESTMENT UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CONCERNS
- The Economics of Contracts: A Primer
- Backward stochastic differential equations and partial differential equations with quadratic growth
- The Principal-Agent Problem With Time Inconsistent Utility Functions
- The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
- Moral Hazard in Teams
- Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions
- Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers Envy their Boss
- Solvability of coupled FBSDEs with quadratic and superquadratic growth
- Theory of Orlicz spaces
- The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization
- Stability and Analytic Expansions of Local Solutions of Systems of Quadratic BSDEs with Applications to a Price Impact Model
- Incomplete Stochastic Equilibria with Exponential Utilities: Close to Pareto Optimality
Cited by
- A stability approach for solving multidimensional quadratic BSDEs
- A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
- Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions
- A Mean Field Competition
- A Note on the Multi-Agent Contracts in Continuous Time
- Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency Without Communication
- Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
- Principal-agent problem with multiple principals
- Instances of uniqueness restoration and equilibria selection in mean field games
- Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference
- Optimal Make-Take Fees in a Multi Market-Maker Environment
- Optimal Dynamic Incentive and Control Contract among Principal and Agents with Moral Hazard and Long-Term Average Reward
- Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems
- A PRINCIPAL–AGENT APPROACH TO CAPACITY REMUNERATION MECHANISMS
- Pushing carbon footprint reduction along environment with carbon-reducing information asymmetry
- Quelques résultats sur les équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades et les principes de grandes déviations pour des estimateurs de paramètres de diffusions
- Optimal Contracts for Agents with Adverse Selection
- Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contracts between a Principal and Multiple Agents in Controlled Markov Processes: A Constructive Approach
- Is There a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's Principal-Agent Problem?
- Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
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