Model of Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract of Independent Directors Considering Reputation Mechanism and its Application
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 2006-01-01
- Cited by
- 0
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- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2366585198
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:156129922
Keywords
Reputation, Incentive, Mechanism (biology), Microeconomics, Contract theory
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