The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling approach

Keywords

Incentive, Economics, Signalling, Finance, Microeconomics

References

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Cited by

• Эмпирический подход к иерархической теории структуры капиталаС. И. Луценко — 2010
• Lo and Behold! Modigliani & Miller's Homemade Leverage Proof is a FallacyRoger Dayala — 2013
• La structure du capital et son impact sur la profitabilité et sur la demande de travail : analyses théoriques et empiriques sur données de panel françaisesMazen Kebewar — 2012
• Financial theory and the theory of investmentJoel Fried — 1992
• Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-Controlled Firms: Evidence from PakistanFahad Abdullah, Attaullah Shah, Safi Ullah Khan — 2012
• The Significance and Certification of Shelf RegistrationsClay Moffett, J. Edward Graham, William H. Sackley — 2011
• Essays On Innovation And Capital StructureJiahong Zhang — 2010
• The importance of the generation and size category factors in the financing decision of family-owned firmsRui Manuel Sobral Rita — 2013
• Ownership Structure and Firm Value: New Evidence from the Spanish Corporate Governance SystemAlberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre — 2003
• Alternative Models of Financial System DevelopmentStephen D. Prowse — 1996
• Leverage and Corporate Performance: A Frontier Efficiency Analysis on European CountriesLaurent Weill — 2003
• Leverage and Debt Maturity: The Implication of Size and Market QuotationEilnaz Kashefi‐Pour — 2012
• TAXATION AND CORPORATE USE OF DEBT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX POLICYRoger Gordon — 2010
• Auditing as a Signal in Small Business LendingBala G. Dharan — 1992
• Corporate Governance and Auditor Choice Among Companies in GCC CountriesKhaled Salmen Aljaaidi — 2013
• Disentangling the Performance and Entrenchment Effect of Family Shareholding: A Study of Indian Corporate GovernanceManoranjan Pattanayak — 2008
• FAKTOR-FAKTOR YANG MENDORONG PENCIPTAAN NILAI PERUSAHAAN DI BEIHendri Gusaptono — 2012
• La influencia de la regulación sobre la estructura de capital de las empresasEduardo José Menéndez Alonso — 1999
• Improving Corporate Internet Reporting in ChinaChaojie Liu — 2014
• Awards are a Special Kind of SignalBruno S. Frey, Jana Gallus — 2014

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