Elimination of Randomization in Certain Statistical Decision Procedures and Zero-Sum Two-Person Games
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1951-03-01
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 0
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2082809943
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:122999024
Keywords
Mathematics, Convexity, Minimax, Section (typography), Counterexample
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- A New Method for Constructing Exact Tests Without Making Any Assumptions
- The origins of dynamic inventory modelling under uncertainty: (the men, their work and connection with the Stanford Studies)
- Purification, saturation and the exact law of large numbers
- Robust Estimation of Some Nonregular Parameters
- Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
- Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality
- On Strongly Equivalent Nonrandomized Transition Probabilities
- Robust Markov perfect equilibria
- Testing one Simple Hypothesis Against Another
- On a Characterisation of the Gamma Distribution
- Admissibility of Conditional Confidence Procedures
- On the theory of statistical decision functions
- The theory of dynamic programming
- Pure strategy Markov equilibrium in stochastic games with a continuum of players
- On a theorem of Dvoretsky, Wald, and Wolfowitz concerning Liapounov Measures
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