Boards of Directors of Publicly-Held Companies in Brazil: Profile and Implications for Minority Shareholders

Keywords

Shareholder, Accounting, Proxy (statistics), Business, Voting

References

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Cited by

• Shareholder engagement in emerging markets: institutional and organisational determinants in Brazil and South AfricaCamila Yamahaki — 2013
• Instrumenty ochrony praw akcjonariuszy mniejszościowych w polskim systemie nadzoru korporacyjnegoAgnieszka Ignyś-Lipowiecka — 2010
• Does Diversity of Bank Board Members Affect Performance and Risk? Evidence from an Emerging MarketBowo Setiyono, Amine Tarazi — 2014
• Family Control and Executive CompensationJohanna Palmberg — 2012
• Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Investment PerformanceJohan Eklund, Johanna Palmberg, Daniel Wiberg — 2009
• Does a Family-Controlled Firm Perform Better in Corporate Venturing?Ying‐Jiuan Wong, Shao‐Chi Chang — 2010
• Information Theory of FirmDimitri O. Ledenyov, Viktor O. Ledenyov — 2015
• A review of Latin American corporate governance literature: 2000‐2009Jean Harris — 2009
• Left to their fate: rights of minority equity holders in Ghanaian firmsOtuo Serebour Agyemang, Emmanuel Aboagye, Joyce Frimpong — 2015
• The performance effect of corporate board of directorsJohanna Palmberg — 2015
• Does Board Heterogeneity Improve Investment Decisions? Board composition and investment performance in Swedish listed firmsJohan Eklund, Johanna Palmberg, Daniel Wiberg — 2008
• Evolution and Determinants of Firm-Level Corporate Governance Quality in BrazilAlexandre Di Miceli da Silveira, Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal, André Carvalhal — 2007
• BUSY BOARDS: HOW DOES THE SIMULTANEOUS PARTICIPATION OF DIRECTORS IN MULTIPLE COMPANIES AFFECT THE BOARD'S ACTIVITIES?Sandra Álvarez Guerra, Rafael Liza Santos — 2011
• Institutional Determinants of Private Shareholder Engagement in Brazil and South Africa: The Role of RegulationCamila Yamahaki, Jędrzej George Frynas — 2016
• The role of the board commissioners in the implementation of the principles of good corporate governance and the achievement of the performance of bank perkreditan rakyat in tasikmalayaDedi Kusmayadi, Iwan Hermansyah — 2018
• BOARD STRUCTURES OF DEPOSIT BANKS OPERATING IN TURKEY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP: A PANEL DATA ANALYSISDamla EKER — 2022
• Evolution and determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality in BrazilAlexandre Di Miceli da Silveira, Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal, Lucas Ayres Barreira de Campos Barros e André Luiz Carvalhal-da-Silva — 2009
• THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF PARASTATALS IN KENYAH. Murage, Mohamed N. Mwachiti, M. Njoroge — 2016
• BUSY BOARDS : HOW DOES THE SIMULTANEOUS PARTICIPATION OF DIRECTORS IN MULTIPLE COMPANIES AFFECT THE BOARD ’ S ACTIVITIES ?S. Guerra, Rafael Liza Santos — 2012

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