Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
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Summary
Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents and the efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2009-01-01
- Cited by
- 117
- References
- 42
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W1993970692
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:16671758
Keywords
Bounded function, Zero (linguistics), Mathematics, Combinatorics, Subsidy
References
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- Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information
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- Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
- Aggregation and revelation of preferences
- Incentives in public decision-making
- Rational Competitive Analysis
- Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency
- Polling Mechanisms and the Demand Revelation Problem
- Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: a closed form solution
- New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods
- The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing
- The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
Cited by
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand
- Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
- Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
- Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- On Sharing the Benefits of Communication
- Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information
- Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics
- Redistribution in online mechanisms
- Three essays in social choice and mechanism design
- Optimizing Payments in Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms for Multi-Parameter Domains
- Optimal Platform Design
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers
- Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Inter‐domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
- A Two-Stage Mechanism in Assembly System with Supplier Coalitions under Asymmetric Information
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
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