The place of political science in public choice

Keywords

Public finance, Politics, Public choice, Political science, International political economy

References

• A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonmentsRichard P. Barke, William H. Riker — 1982
• Laboratory Experiments in Economics: The Implications of Posted-Price InstitutionsCharles R. Plott — 1986
• Effect of Market Organization on Competitive EquilibriumVernon L. Smith — 1964
• Product Quality Signaling in Experimental MarketsRoss M. Miller, Charles R. Plott — 1985
• Railway abandonments, cross-subsidies, and the theory of regulationWilliam R. Dougan — 1984
• Toward a More General Theory of RegulationSam Peltzman — 1976
• Events and SituationsWilliam H. Riker — 1957
• Causes of EventsWilliam H. Riker — 1958
• An Experimental Study of Competitive Market BehaviorVernon L. Smith — 1962
• The Theory of Economic RegulationGeorge J. Stigler — 2021
• Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord KeynesRichard B. McKenzie, James M. Buchanan, Richard E. Wagner — 1977
• The Social SystemRoutledge Sociology Classics, Karl Mannheim, T. Parsons — 2021

Cited by

• Comments on : 'The decline and rise of political economy', by Bruce YandleJos de Beus — 1990
• The Contributions and Impact of Professor William H. RikerKellie Maske, Garey C. Durden — 2003
• Congress is a “They,” not an “It”: Legislative intent as oxymoronKenneth A. Shepsle — 1992
• Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotasWilliam H. Kaempfer, Thomas D. Willett — 1989
• Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy GamesA.M.A. van Deemen — 1991
• Empirical social choice: an introductionPeter Kurrild‐Klitgaard — 2014
• Economic Ethics and Institutional ChangeAntonio Argandoña — 2004
• Cooperation and social choice: how foresight can induce fairnessElizabeth Maggie Penn — 2003
• The Political Psychology of Rational Choice TheoryWilliam H. Riker — 1995
• Public choice and political science: a view from EuropePeter Kurrild‐Klitgaard — 2018
• Cartel and Rational Choice Institutionalism:The Case of Garlic Commodity Import in IndonesiaTonny Timbul Tampubolon, Gabriel Lele, Wahyudi Kumorotomo — 2022
• Setting the Stage for Disciplinary Transformations: Riker, McKenzie, and the Case of the University of RochesterGianluca Damiani — 2024
• Opposition und Staat. Zur Grundlegung der ParteiendemokratieSimon T. Franzmann — 2016
• Empirical Studies in Institutional Change: A political theory of the origin of property rights: airport slotsW. Riker, I. Sened — 1991
• Setting the stage for disciplinary transformations. The Case of the University of Rochester in the 1960sG. Damiani

Related papers

• Chicago political economy: A public choice perspectiveWilliam C. Mitchell — 1989
• Public choice in the new centuryWilliam F. Shughart, Robert D. Tollison — 2005
• Schumpeter and public choice, Part I: Precursor to public choice?William C. Mitchell — 1984
• Special Issue on Austrian and Public Choice EconomicsPeter J. Boettke, Edward J. López — 2002
• An alternative to “A public choice theory of the Great Contraction”DouglasA. Huberman — 1990
• Public choice and political philosophyLoren Ε. Lomasky — 2012
• Behavioral economics and public choice: introduction to a special issueGregory DeAngelo, Bryan C. McCannon — 2021
• Louis Kaplow: The theory of taxation and public economicsMarc Fleurbaey — 2009
• Public choice and public lifeRandy T. Simmons — 2012
• Thanks to Gordon TullockRoger D. Congleton — 2015