OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR TEAMS
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1991-08-01
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 17
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W1967138754
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:154243810
Keywords
Moral hazard, Adverse selection, Outcome (game theory), Incentive, Principal (computer security)
References
- Incentives in cooperative research and development
- Moral Hazard in Teams
- Auctions and Bidding
- The Economics of Agency.
- Incentives and Worker Behavior: Some Evidence
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
- Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
- Competition for Agency Contracts
- The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth
- Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules
- The Moral Hazard of Budget-Breaking
- Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
- Studies in Resource Allocation Processes.
- Auctioning Incentive Contracts
- Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation And Control-Systems
- AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
Cited by
- Regulation of a vertically differentiated duopoly
- Individual Incentives within Team Competitions
- L'influence des règles collectives d'allocation de l'eau sur les choix stratégiques des agriculteurs : des petits périmètres irrigués tunisiens aux prélèvements en rivière dans le bassin de l'Adour
- Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams
- Vrienden op de werkvloer
- Selection, Learning, and Nomination: Essays on Supermodular Games, Design, and Political Theory
- Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior
- Audit Committee Effectiveness and Voluntary Disclosure in Malaysia: PRE and Post Introduction of the Revisd Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007
- Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan
- Moral hazard in teams with limited punishments and multiple outputs
- Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents
- Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
- Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An Assessment of Proposed Explanations
- Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring
- Credit History: The Changing Nature of Scientific Credit
- Competitive effort and employment determination with team production
- Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note
- Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real-Effort Experiment
- Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
- The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity
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