Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Keywords

Economics, Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Econometrics, Neoclassical economics

References

• Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesJohn C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten — 1989
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated GamesEhud Kalai, William Stanford — 1988
• The evolution of cooperationRobert Axelrod, W D Hamilton — 1981
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterionAriel Rubinstein — 1979
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete InformationDrew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin — 1986
• A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesJohn C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten — 1988
• Game Theoretical AnalysisR. Avenhaus — 1986

Cited by

• In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discountingMatthijs van Veelen — 2007
• Selection of opponents in the prisoner׳s dilemma in dynamic networks: an experimental approach.Hiroto Yonenoh, Eizo Akiyama — 2014
• Transaction Cost Economics in International Relations: The Case of International Antitrust EnforcementMartin Holterman — 2007
• Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading ListW. Weibull — 2010
• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemmaChristian Hilbe, Arne Traulsen, Karl Sigmund — 2015
• Determinants of economic preferencesAnna Dreber Almenberg — 2009
• The Coevolution of Cooperation and Trait DistinctionJae‐Suk Yang, Jung-Kyoo Choi, Hang-Hyun Jo — 2008
• An economic enquiry into the welfare effects of fair-tradeS. Telford — 2011
• Coordinated Punishment Does Not Proliferate When Defectors Can Also Punish CooperatorsCollin M. McCabe, David G. Rand — 2014
• Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolutionStefano Demichelis, Jörgen W. Weibull — 2008
• The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local MutationsAlexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin — 2015
• The Evolution of Revolution: Is Splintering Inevitable?Atin Basuchoudhary, Laura Razzolini — 2018
• In Defense or Defect or Cooperation Does not Justify the Solution ConceptOscar Volij — 1999
• Zero-Determinant Strategies in Noisy Repeated GamesDong Hao, Zhihai Rong, Tao Zhou — 2014
• A selected survey of traditional and evolutionary game theoryU. Rashid Sumaila, Joseph Apaloo — 2002
• Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA FootballBrad R. Humphreys, Jane E. Ruseski — 2009
• THE EVOLUTION OF FAIRNESS IN A BIOLOGICAL MARKETJean‐Baptiste André, Nicolas Baumard — 2011
• Social Functions of Emotions in Social DilemmasMaarten J. J. Wubben — 2005
• AUCTIONS WITH ADAPTIVE ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT AGENTSJames Andreoni, John H. Miller — 1990
• Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games (based on work with D. Fudenberg)Eric Maskin — 2007

Related papers

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete InformationDrew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin — 1986
• Five Rules for the Evolution of CooperationMartin A. Nowak — 2006
• The Evolution of Reciprocal AltruismRobert Trivers — 1971
• The evolution of cooperationRobert Axelrod, W D Hamilton — 1981
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automataKenneth Binmore, Larry Samuelson — 1992
• A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma gameMartin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund — 1993
• Tit for tat in heterogeneous populationsMartin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund — 1992
• The Logic of Animal ConflictJohn Maynard Smith, George Price — 1973
• Evolution and the theory of gamesJohn Maynard Smith — 1976