An `Incomplete Contract' Approach to Bankruptcy and the Financial Structure of the Firm

Keywords

Bankruptcy, Business, Incomplete contracts, Financial structure, Finance

References

• Myths of the West : lessons from developed countries for development financeColin Mayer — 1989

Cited by

• Incorporating Anglo-American Reorganization Provisions in Bankruptcy Law： A 10-year Lesson From ThailandSupruet, Thavomyutikam, Natthinee — 2013
• Is 'Bounded Rationality' an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?Oliver Hart — 1990
• Economics of Market Socialism and the Issue of Public Enterprise Reform in Developing CountriesPranab Bardhan — 1992
• Are the distinctions between debt and equity disappearing? An overviewRichard W. Kopcke, Eric S. Rosengren — 1989
• Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rulesStanley D. Longhofer — 1994
• The Polish Experience in Bank and Enterprise RestructuringFernando Montes-Negret, Luca Papi — 1999
• Public Ownership as a Sufficient Condition for the Soft Budget ConstraintDavid Li — 1992
• Financial factors in the investment decisions of firms : theory and evidenceIoannis Ganoulis — 1990
• Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firmOliver Hart — 1988
• Myths of the West : lessons from developed countries for development financeColin Mayer — 1989
• A Brief Overview of the Economics of Incomplete MarketsJean‐Jacques Laffont — 1989
• Cooperative R&D with product market competitionJay Pil Choi — 1993
• Asymmetric Information, Financial Markets, and Financial Institutions: Where are We Currently Going?Martin Hellwig — 1989
• Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equityLeslie M. Marx — 1998
• Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient ContractsJerry R. Green, Jean‐Jacques Laffont — 1992
• Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract designPatrick Bolton — 1990
• An analysis of the conditions for the validity of Modigliani-Miller Theorem with incomplete marketsPiero Gottardi — 1995
• The Multicontract OrganizationJean Tirole — 1988
• One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate ControlSanford J. Grossman, Oliver Hart — 1987
• Payout Policy, Capital Structure, and Compensation Contracts when Managers Value ControlChun Chang — 1993

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