Firm and Managerial Incentives to Manipulate the Timing of Project Resolution

Keywords

Incentive, Resolution (logic), Business, Computer science, Industrial organization

References

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Cited by

• Earnings Management around Research and Development ManipulationRihab Guidara, Younés Boujelbène — 2014
• Essays on corporate social responsibility : a thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance, School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, 30 August 2014Christo Ferreira — 2014
• New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310Jeffrey L. Coles, Chun Keung Hoi — 2003
• The Optimal Timing of CEO CompensationPierre Chaigneau — 2017
• Reputation Effects and InvestmentYu‐Cheng Chen, Victor W. Liu — 2005
• The Theory and Practice of Myopic ManagementNatalie Mizik — 2010
• But is it Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial IncentivesJonathan Carmel — 2008
• Managerial Career Concerns and Investments in InformationTodd T. Milbourn, Richard L. Shockley, Anjan V. Thakor — 2001
• Positive hurdle rates without asymmetric informationQi Chen, Wei Jiang — 2004
• Career-Risk Concerns, Information Effort, and Optimal Pay-for-Performance SensitivityQi Chen, Shane S. Dikolli, Wei Jiang — 2015
• Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial RegulationDavid Hirshleifer — 2008
• A Theory of Efficient Short-TermismRichard T. Thakor — 2016
• Corporate Social Responsibility: The Myopic Barometer?Christo Ferreira, David K. Ding, Udomsak Wongchoti — 2015
• Corporate social responsibility and myopic management practice: Is there a link?David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Vu Minh Ngo — 2023
• Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial RegulationDavid Hirshleifer — 2007
• The optics of corporate governance: External stakeholders, information environments, and reputation sustainabilityT. Noe — 2021
• Psychological Influences on Financial Regulation and PolicyDavid Hirshleifer, S. Teoh — 2011

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