Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business

Keywords

Agency (philosophy), Incentive, Principal–agent problem, Structure and agency, Transfer pricing

References

No references recorded for this paper.

Cited by

• CEO duality and firm performance: an empirical study of EU listed firmsHuining Chen — 2014
• Teaching Finance EthicsJohn R. Boatright — 1998
• Managing Third-Party funding Projects at German State Universities - a Theoretical Deduction of Design Principles for Implementing an IT-ArtifactStefan Gröger, Matthias Schümann — 2014
• Pour une meilleure compréhension de la dynamique des relations de coopération durables en milieu industriel : étude de 9 cas de PME sous-traitantesAbdellatif Ezzerari — 2008
• Rentabilidad de la firma y convenio colectivo de empresa: análisis empírico para Castilla y LeónMercedes Redondo Cristóbal, Francisco Javier Jimeno de la Maza — 2009
• Tuberculosis treatment in high TB / HIV settings : evaluating public-private partnerships in South Africa.Edina Sinanovic — 2004
• Organisation et financement de la gestion des déchets ménagers dans les villes de l'Afrique Subsaharienne : le cas de la ville de Cotonou au BéninRoch Edgard GBINLO — 2010
• Principal-Agent Issues in Private Equity and Venture CapitalVijay Mehta — 2004
• Construction et management de compétences collectives dans le cadre de relations inter-organisationnelles : une approche communicationelle : le cas du secteur du transport de meubles neufs en FranceNicolas Arnaud — 2007
• Wie organisiert ist das organisierte Verbrechen?Axel T. Paul, Benjamin Schwalb — 2011
• The governance schema of regional and rural public hospital nurses: how relevant are the dimensions of stewardship governance and trust in management?Kim Clark — 2013
• The Impact of Initial Public Offerings on the External Growth Strategies of Entrepreneurial FirmsTobias S. Schmidt, Michael Dowling, Christian Lechner — 2006
• Deployed electronic medical record policy compliance: An intra-department principal-agent perspectiveMark Mellott — 2010
• Negotiating Agents and Bargaining Processes: Maximizing Member State Interests in COREPERHeather Elko McKibben — 2007
• McGregor’s theory Y vs. Bentham’s panopticism: Toward a critique of the economic theory of agencyDavid Ellerman — 2001
• Achieving Authentication in Electronic Markets: A Principal-Agent PerspectiveAmit Basu, Steve Muylle — 2001
• Empires and International StructureDaniel H. Nexon, Thomas Wright — 2005
• Leadership in collaborative policy-making: An analysis of agency roles in regulatory negotiationsClare M. Ryan — 2001
• The relationship between dual practice and physicians’ work behaviour in the public hospitals: Results from the Danish surveyKarolina Socha, Mickael Bech, J. B. Winsløwsvej — 2011
• Delegation of Specification: An Agency Theory of OrganizationsBarry M. Mitnick — 2012

Related papers

• Separation of Ownership and ControlEugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen — 1983
• Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureMichael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling — 1976
• The Economic Institutions of CapitalismWilliam M. Dugger — 1987
• The Modern Corporation and Private PropertyJoseph V. Kline, Adolph A. Berle, Gardiner C. Means — 1932
• Agency Problems and the Theory of the FirmEugene F. Fama — 1980
• The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismGeorge A. Akerlof — 1970
• Agency Theory: An Assessment and ReviewKathleen M. Eisenhardt — 1989
• The Nature of the FirmRonald H. Coase — 1937
• The New Economics of OrganizationTerry M. Moe — 1984
• The Economics of Agency.Kenneth J. Arrow — 1984