Essays in empirical corporate finance: CEO compensation, social interactions, and M&A
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- Type
- dissertation
- Published
- 2012-07-01
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 146
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W71658446
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:167160682
Keywords
Executive compensation, Corporate governance, Negotiation, Compensation (psychology), Affect (linguistics)
References
- Regulating Executive Pay: Assessing the Impact of the Tax-Deductibility Cap on Executive Compensation
- Enhancing Audit Committee Effectiveness
- Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey. (Part 1: A Review of the Literature on Corporate Governance)
- Do outside directors monitor managers
- CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures
- The Geography of Executive Compensation
- The Acquisition Performance of S&P 500 Firms
- Employment networks and the CEO labor market
- The Market for CEO Talent: Implications for CEO Compensation
- Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
- Corporate Leverage: How Much Do Managers Really Matter?
- Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction
- Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure Rules
- Do Independence and Financial Expertise of the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance?
- Negotiating with Labor Under Financial Distress
- Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors
- Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options
- The gains to bidding firms from merger
- Efficient Bargains and the McDonald-Solow Conjecture
- Board Connections and M&A Transactions