The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models.
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- Type
- article
- Published
- 1993-01-01
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 0
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W47172750
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:115689385
Keywords
Bounded rationality, Probabilistic logic, Bounded function, Rationality, Mathematics
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