Acting, Intending, and Artificial Intelligence

Summary

Hauser considers John Searle's attempt to distinguish acts from movements and concludes that the performances in question provide prima facie warrant for attributions of mental properties that considerations of consciousness are insufficient to override.

Keywords

Prima facie, Raising (metalworking), Consciousness, Attribution, Psychology

References

Actions, Reasons, And CausesDonald Davidson — 1980
Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and IntentionalityJohn R. Searle — 1989
Is the brain's mind a computer program?Searle — 1990
Minds, brains, and programsJohn R. Searle — 1980
On Sense and ReferenceGottlob Frege — 2021
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Christopher Peacocke, John R. Searle — 1986
Intentionality: Intention and actionJ. Searle — 1983

Cited by

Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room ArgumentLarry Hauser — 1997
The sense of ‘thinking’Larry Hauser — 1993
The Turing ’ s Test and the Zombie ArgumentsDaniel Kostić — 2004

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