Partial Revelation Automated Mechanism Design

Summary

This work provides a set of optimization routines that can be combined to address the trade-offs between the amount of communication, approximation of incentive properties, and objective value achieved by a mechanism.

Keywords

Mechanism design, Computer science, Mechanism (biology), Set (abstract data type), Function (biology)

References

Regret-based Incremental Partial Revelation MechanismsNathanaël Hyafil, Craig Boutilier — 2006
Mechanism Design with Partial RevelationNathanaël Hyafil, Craig Boutilier — 2007
Automated Design of Multistage MechanismsTüomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier — 2007
Optimal Auction DesignRoger B. Myerson — 1981
Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial AuctionsSaurabh Sanghvi, David C. Parkes — 2004
Constraint-based optimization and utility elicitation using the minimax decision criterionCraig Boutilier, Relu Patrascu, Pascal Poupart — 2006
Auctions with severely bounded communicationLiad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan — 2002
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting pricesNoam Nisan, Ilya Segal — 2006
Unifying computers and dynamical systems using the theory of synchronous concurrent algorithmsB.C. Thompson, John V. Tucker, J. I. Zucker — 2009
Auctions with Severely Bounded CommunicationLiad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan, Ilya Segal — 2007
Complexity of Mechanism DesignVincent Conitzer, Tüomas Sandholm — 2002

Cited by

Mechanism Design and Analysis Using Simulation-Based Game ModelsMichael P. Wellman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik — 2008
Regret-based Incremental Partial Revelation MechanismsNathanaël Hyafil, Craig Boutilier — 2006
Mechanisms for information elicitationAviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein — 2008
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism designPaul Dütting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes — 2011
LABORATOIRE DE THÉORIE ET APPLICATION D'ALGORITHMES PROGRAMME DOCTORAL EN INFORMATIQUE, COMMUNICATIONS ET INFORMATIONPaúl David — 2013
Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility under Partial InformationVijay Menon, Kate Larson — 2019
Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choiceTyler Lu, Craig Boutilier — 2020
Computationally Feasible Approaches to Automated Mechanism DesignMingyu Guo — 2010

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