Abduction As Belief Revision: A Model of Preferred Explanations

Keywords

Preference, Belief revision, Normality, Natural (archaeology), Computer science

References

• A Logic for Revision and Subjunctive QueriesCraig Boutilier — 1992
• Normative, Subjunctive, and Autoepistemic Defaults: Adopting the Ramsey TestCraig Boutilier — 1992
• A Knowledge-Level Account of AbductionHector J. Levesque — 1989
• Inaccessible Worlds and Irrelevance: Preliminary ReportCraig Boutilier — 1991
• Rank-based Systems: A Simple Approach to Belief Revision, Belief Update, and Reasoning about Evidence and ActionsMoisés Goldszmidt, Judea Pearl — 1992
• Preferred Subtheories: An Extended Logical Framework for Default ReasoningGerhard Brewka — 1989
• Conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revisionCraig Boutilier — 1992
• Philosophy of Natural ScienceCarl G. Hempel — 1966
• Explanation and prediction: an architecture for default and abductive reasoningDavid Poole — 1989
• Peirce's Philosophy of Science: Critical Studies in His Theory of Induction and Scientific MethodBruce Altshuler, Nicholas Rescher — 1978
• A Logical Framework for Depiction and Image InterpretationRaymond Reiter, Alan K. Mackworth — 1989
• Abduction as Belief RevisionCraig Boutilier, Veronica Beche — 1995
• A Theory of Diagnosis from First PrinciplesRaymond Reiter — 1986
• Diagnosing Multiple FaultsJohan de Kleer, Brian C. Williams — 1987
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functionsCarlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, David Makinson — 1985
• Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: Networks of plausible inferenceStig Kjær Andersen — 1991
• Characterizing DiagnosesJohan de Kleer, Alan K. Mackworth, Raymond Reiter — 1990
• Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic statesPeter Menzies, Peter Gärdenfors — 1988
• Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible InferenceJudea Pearl — 1988
• Using Default and Causal Reasoning in Diagnosis.Kurt Konolige — 1992

Cited by

• On the evolving relation between Belief Revision and ArgumentationMarcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner — 2011
• Unifying Default Reasoning and Belief Revision in a Modal FrameworkCraig Boutilier — 1994
• Abductive Consequence RelationsJorge Lobo, Carlos Uzcátegui — 1997
• Explanations, belief revision and defeasible reasoningMarcelo Alejandro Falappa, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Guillermo Ricardo Simari — 2002
• The Probability of a Possibility: Adding Uncertainty to Default RulesCraig Boutilier — 1993
• On reconciling conflicting updates (a compromised revision approach)Fatima Cristina Canazaro Dargram — 1996
• Toward a Peircean Theory of Human Learning: Revealing the Misconception of Belief RevisionMary A. Keeler, Uta Priss — 2013
• A Compromise Revision Model for Reconciling UpdatesFátima C. C. Dargam — 1999

Related papers

• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functionsCarlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, David Makinson — 1985
• Explanation in Bayesian belief networksHenri J. Suermondt — 1992
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• Familiarity Effects and Questioning Biases in Human Belief RevisionMarkus Knauff, A. Wolf — 2009
• Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference.Tania Lombrozo — 2016
• Explaining by evidenceEliezer L. Lozinskii — 2000
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• Simplicity and complexity preferences in causal explanation: An opponent heuristic account.Samuel G. B. Johnson, J.J. Valenti, Frank C. Keil — 2019