Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
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Summary
The results suggest that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system and that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2013-08-28
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 26
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W24015312
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:16483515
Keywords
Computer science
References
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- Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
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Cited by
- Can Centralized Sanctioning Promote Trust in Social Dilemmas? A Two-Level Trust Game with Incomplete Information
- Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation
- Unpacking water conflicts: a reinterpretation of coordination problems in China’s water-governance system
- The Chinese characteristics of payments for ecosystem services: a conceptual analysis of water eco-compensation mechanisms
- Modeling Non-Cooperative Water Use in River Basins
- Social incentive factors in interventions promoting sustainable behaviors: A meta-analysis
- China's Water Governmentality and the Shaping of Hydrosocial Territories in the Lancang-Mekong Region
- Shared Waters, Shared Responsibility: Solving Collective Action Problems in an Upstream‐Downstream Setting
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