Evaluation technique in the spicalculus for cryptographic protocols
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Summary
E evade bisimulation is introduced following Abadi and Gordan's framed bisimulation proposal, which would be used to prove that evade bisimilarity, an equivalence relation, is decidable for main security properties: Authenticity and Secrecy.
- Type
- article
- Published
- 2009-12-15
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 29
- Access
- Open access
- OpenAlex
- https://openalex.org/W2165735
- Semantic Scholar
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:50563678
Keywords
Bisimulation, Cryptographic protocol, Decidability, Computer science, Cryptographic primitive
References
- A Survey of Authentication Protocol Literature
- Towards Automatic Bisimilarity Checking in the Spi Calculus
- Analyzing encryption protocols using formal verification techniques
- A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The spi Calculus
- Applying Formal Methods to the Analysis of a Key Management Protocol
- Two facets of authentication
- A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
- A logic of authentication
- A Calculus of Mobile Processes, II
- Three systems for cryptographic protocol analysis
- Proving properties of security protocols by induction
- Proof techniques for cryptographic processes
- Deciding Framed Bisimilarity
- CVS: a compiler for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
- Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
- What do we mean by entity authentication?
- Deciding Framed Bisimilarity
- Communicating and mobile systems - the Pi-calculus
- Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes
- Testing Equivalence for Processes
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